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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has a vital national interest in the maintenance of
international law and order. That interest is not incidental, it is not
transitory or occasional; it is a fundamental interest which is the
result of... living in a world with other nations. We have a right to
protect that interest against law-breakers; and we have a duty to
protect it. Being the strongest Power among the nations,.... we can
at least proclaim that, given certain conditions of a just peace, we
469
are prepared to take our part in maintaining the rule of law in the
future.'
The Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") provides jurisdiction in United States
district courts for an action by an alien, for a tort only, "committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."2 The ATS is
a thirty-three word statement included in the Judiciary Act of 1789 that lay
dormant for 170 years, until the 1980 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala decision
introduced it as a vehicle for non-nationals to hold human rights abusers
civilly liable in U.S. courts.3  This decision was monumental-it
transformed the ATS from an obscure section in a centuries-old act to a
highly controversial jurisdictional grant that has spawned the litigation of
numerous human rights cases in U.S. federal courts.4 Since Filartiga, a
battle has waged between strict constructionists, who argue that the ATS
was meant to be nothing more than a jurisdictional grant for the federal
courts to hear those claims arising under international law that Congress has
so identified, and the opposing camp, which believes that the ATS implicitly
recognizes violations of international law as justiciable private causes of
action.5 And due to the "poverty of drafting history"6 regarding the statute,
1. C. G. Fenwick, International Law and Lawless Nations, 33 AM. J. INT'L L. 743, 746 (1939)
(quoting an editorial comment written in the wake of World War 1).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), this provision was commonly referred to as the "Alien Tort Claims Act" or
"ATCA." See, e.g., Papa v. United States, 281 F.3d 1004, 1007 (9th Cir. 2002). This article will
follow the Sosa Court's lead, however, and refer to 28 U.S.C. § 1350 as the ATS. See Sosa, 124 S.
Ct. at 2746.
3. See 630 F.2d 876, 877-78 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Joshua Ratner, Back to the Future: Why a
Return to the Approach of the Filartiga Court is Essential to Preserve the Legitimacy and Potential
of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 35 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 83 (2001) [hereinafter J. Ratner].
4. See, e.g., Paul E. Hagen & Anthony L. Michaels, The Alien Tort Claims Act: A Primer on
Liability for Multinational Corporations, ALI-ABA Course of Study, Course No. SJ059 Feb. 11-13,
2004, available at WL SJ059 ALI-ABA 319, at *322 (citing Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343
F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2003); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999);
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11 th Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d
1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F. Supp. 2d 424, 443 (D.N.J. 1999);
Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995)).
5. Compare William S. Dodge, The Constitutionality of the Alien Tort Statute: Some
Observations on Text and Context, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 687, 711-12 (2002):
Both the text of the Alien Tort Statute and its historical context demonstrate that the First
Congress did not mean to limit jurisdiction to suits against U.S. citizens or even to
violations of the law of nations that were recognized at that time. Rather, they intended
that the district courts 'have cognizance ... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort
only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.' The text of the
Constitution also shows that 'Laws of the United States' in Article III is broader than
'Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance [of the Constitution]' under
Article VI, and history shows that Article III's phrase ... may be fairly read today, as
including the law of nations. To say this is, of course, not to resolve every aspect of the
debate over the role of customary international law in the U.S. legal system, but it is to
say that Filartiga was constitutional when it was decided.
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neither side has been able to declare victory.7 The United States Supreme
Court's 2004 decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain was thus long-awaited
guidance on the scope and applicability of the ATS to modem day claims
alleging violations of international law.8
In Sosa, the Supreme Court was tasked with determining whether the
illegal detention of a Mexican national violated a norm of international law
sufficient to create a cause of action in U.S. federal courts under the ATS. 9
For once and for all, lower courts, human rights advocates, and potential
defendants alike would finally be instructed on how to ascertain an
actionable claim under the ATS-or would they? The Sosa Court held that
the ATS authorizes jurisdiction over tort suits, brought by aliens, only for
claims that meet the following criteria: (1) the claim rests on a norm of
international character accepted by the civilized world; and (2) the claim is
defined with specificity comparable to those violations of international law
that existed at the time the ATS was enacted.10 With regard to the second
prong, the Sosa Court noted that it considered only three offenses to have
been recognized in the eighteenth-century as violations of the law of nations:
offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conduct, and "individual
with Elizabeth F. Defeis, Litigating Human Rights Abuses in United States Courts: Recent
Developments, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319, 319 (2004) (explaining that "[s]ome scholars,
judges, and the Bush administration" advocate narrowly construing the statute--"[t]hey argue that
the [statute] was designed solely to address piracy or violations of diplomatic immunity and does not
confer a private right of action"). See also Hagen & Michaels, supra note 4, at *322 (noting that the
Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted Filartiga's position that the ATS "not only
provides subject matter jurisdiction, but also creates a private cause of action" for tort-like injuries
sustained in violation of international law).
6. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2758.
7. See lIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (1975) (noting that the ATS is a "legal
Lohengrin... no one seems to know whence it came"); see also Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2758 (discussing
the scarce evidence of legislative intent regarding the ATS).
There is no record of. .. discussion about private actions that might be subject to the
jurisdictional provision ... to create private remedies; there is no record even of debate
on the section. Given the poverty of drafting history, modern commentators have
necessarily concentrated on the text... [b]ut despite considerable scholarly attention, it is
fair to say that a consensus understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive.
Id.; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 812 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that
neither the Senate nor the House debates regarding the Judiciary Act of 1789 mention the ATS
provision); Defeis, supra note 5, at 319.
8. See generally Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2747 (granting certiorari, in part, to determine the scope of
the ATS).
9. Id. at 2746.
10. Id. at 2761-62 ("[W]e think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.").
actions arising out of prize captures and piracy . . . ."" ATS watchers
received their long-awaited guidance, but it did not solve the debate as either
side may have hoped.12  The Court merely shifted the debate to revolve
around the question, what does the Sosa standard mean?
This article argues that the Sosa standard is as follows. First, the
Court's requirement that the claim be based on a "norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world" means that the claim must rest on
a violation of customary international law.13 Second, the Court's stipulation
that the claim must be "defined with a specificity comparable to the features
of the [recognized historical] paradigms" means that the violation of
customary international law must mirror those qualities that made the
historical offenses unique. 14  This article suggests that the historical
paradigms were singled out as violations of international law because they
were specific torts, committed by individuals, which had ramifications for
international security-and as such, nations universally and obligatorily
recognized them. To that end, Part II of this article provides a brief history
of ATS litigation in U.S. courts.' 5 Part III delves into the Sosa case itself. It
summarizes the facts of the case and analyzes the standard set forth by the
Supreme Court. 6 Part IV speculates on the impact that Sosa will have on
future ATS litigation. It identifies the issues the Sosa Court failed to
address, and applies the Sosa standard to the facts of the Doe v. Unocal case
to illustrate Sosa's implications for corporate defendants. 1" Finally, Part V
concludes Sosa did leave the "door ajar" for modem-day human rights
violations to be actionable under the ATS, but notes that the decision did
11. Id. at 2759 (referencing An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United
States, ch. 9, §§ 8, 28, 1 Stat. 112, 113-14, 118 (1790)). Blackstone's Commentaries were written in
the same period that the ATS was passed. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68. The
Court noted that Blackstone mentioned three specific offenses against the law of nations that
criminal law in England acknowledged at the time: "violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy." Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2756.
12. See David L. Hudson, Jr., Foreign Turf" Human Rights Suits Against Corporations Hinge on
How Open the Door Is, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2004, at 20. Human rights advocates and anti-ATS groups
alike are holding Sosa out as a victory for their side. Id. Human rights advocates emphasize that the
Supreme Court left the "door... ajar" for claims to arise under the ATS and did not limit the statute
merely to providing U.S. federal courts with jurisdiction to hear congressionally authorized causes of
action. Id. (quoting Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2764). Anti-ATS groups, by contrast, focus on the Sosa
Court's stipulation that claims must be comparable to the three designated eighteenth-century
offenses, and construe that language to mean that only claims that are analogous to the historical
paradigms are actionable. Id.
13. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
14. Id. at 2761-62.
15. See infra notes 19-47 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 48-118 and accompanying text.
17. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th
Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); infra notes 119-99 and
accompanying text.
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little to quell the controversy surrounding ATS litigation in the United
States. 1
8
II. HISTORY OF ATS LITIGATION
A. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala: Establishing a Civil Remedy in U.S. Courts for
Human Rights Violations Under the ATS
Looking for a way to avenge the death of their son/brother Joelito, Dr.
Joel Filartiga and his daughter Dolly invoked an all-but-forgotten statute
from 1789 and filed suit in U.S. federal district court against defendant
Americo Norberto Pena-Irala.' 9 Pena-Irala was an ex-police officer from
Paraguay whom they alleged was responsible for torturing and murdering
Joelito in retaliation for Dr. Filartiga's outspoken political activity.2 ° The
district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that
(a) Pena-Irala could be tried for perpetuating torture under the color of
authority, because such an act violated "well-established, universally
recognized norms of international law;" and (b) the district court had the
authority to hold the defendant civilly liable, regardless of the nationality of
the parties and the fact that the tort occurred abroad, because it had
jurisdiction to do so under the ATS. 21 The significance of this decision
cannot be overstated. Filartiga took a statute that had basically no previous
application and used it to establish a "civil remedy in [U.S.] federal court for
severe human rights violations rising to the level of customary international
law."22 This paved the way for dozens of ATS claims to be filed in U.S.
courts throughout the next twenty-five years.23 Many of the claims filed
were dismissed on doctrinal or procedural grounds (e.g., forum non
conveniens), but federal courts from several circuits applied the Filartiga
holding to recognize a small set of actionable violations in addition to
18. See infra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
19. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980).
20. Id.
21. /d. at 887-89.
22. See J. Ratner, supra note 3, at 84.
23. See, e.g., Defeis, supra note 5, at 320 (noting that since the Filartiga decision in 1980,
plaintiffs seeking civil remedies in U.S. courts for injuries committed abroad (a) are from countries
as diverse as "Argentina, Bosnia, Burma, Chile, China, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Haiti,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Paraguay, and the Philippines;" and (b) allege violations of international law
ranging from "arbitrary detention, forced disappearance, torture, extra judicial killing, genocide, war
crimes, [to] crimes against humanity").
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torture.24 These included summary execution, disappearance, war crimes,
crimes against humanity, and slavery.25
B. The Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA'): A Congressional
Endorsement of A TS Litigation
A decade later, Congress weighed in on the ATS issue and passed the
Torture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). 26 The TVPA essentially codified
the Filartiga decision, and expanded it to provide civil recourse for U.S.
citizens, as well as aliens, who are victims of torture abroad.27 The TVPA
provides a substantive cause of action for civil liability against an individual
guilty of committing torture or extrajudicial killing under the color of law of
a foreign nation.28  This is a significant step in the evolution of ATS
litigation because it validated the federal courts' decision to use the ATS to
recognize and adjudicate civil liability claims arising from violations of
international law.29  Due to the ATS's ambiguous roots, the courts
previously had no way of knowing how Congress viewed the statute, and
whether it was meant to be only a jurisdictional grant or if it authorized the
courts to recognize customary international norms and substantive causes of
action arising thereunder. 30 The TVPA House and Senate Reports clarified
this issue.3 The Reports validated the federal courts' interpretation of the
ATS as it had been applied in Filartiga and subsequent cases, and indicated
that the ATS could and should be used by courts to recognize additional
claims arising under customary international law.3 2 Committee reports are
24. See Beth Stephens, "The Door Is Still Ajar"for Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts, 70
BROOK. L. REv. 533, 537 n.18 (citing Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996);
Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 845-46 (1996); Kadic v. Karazdic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
and Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 184 (D. Mass. 1995)).
25. See id.
26. Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)) [hereinafter TVPA].
27. id.
28. Id.
29. See Stephens, supra note 24, for a sampling of those claims successfully brought under the
ATS since Filartiga.
30. See supra note 7.
31. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-367, pt. 1 (1991); S. REP. NO. 102-249 (1991).
32. See Jordan J. Paust, The History, Nature, and Reach of the Alien Tort Claims Act, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 249, 256 n.19 (2004) [hereinafter J. Paust-Alien Tort Claims Act] (explaining that the
TVPA was not meant to supersede the ATS).
Both the House and Senate Reports concerning enactment of the [TVPA] express a
congressional resolve that the [ATS] "should remain intact to permit suits based on...
norms [other than torture and extrajudicial killing] that already exist or may ripen in the
future into rules of customary international law."
Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-367, pt. 1, at 4; S. REP. NO. 102-249, at 3); see also Flores v. S. Peru
Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 4 (1991), which
states that the TVPA was intended to "establish an unambiguous basis for a cause of action that has
474
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not binding authority and do not of course grant federal courts the power to
create substantive causes of action in violation of their Constitutional
limitations. The legislative history surrounding the enactment of the TVPA
nevertheless provides persuasive evidence that Congress supports a reading
of the ATS that allows the courts to adjudicate claims arising from violations
of established, customary international law.33
C. Kadic v. Karazdic: Extending ATS Liability to Non-State Actors
The next chapter in the ATS book was written when the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Kadic v. Karazdic.34 Filartiga held that claims
involving violations of international law committed by state officials or
those acting under the color of law could be brought under the ATS.3" Kadic
expanded ATS liability to private actors for a limited group of universally
condemned international law violations.3 6  In Kadic, Croat and Muslim
citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina alleged that defendant Karazdic, the
president of a self-proclaimed republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, was
responsible for carrying out atrocities against them, such as genocide,
summary execution, and torture.37 Karazdic responded that the plaintiffs
failed to allege "violations of the norms of international law because such
norms bind only states and persons acting under color of a state's law, not
private individuals". . . and that he was not a state actor.38 The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Karazdic's argument. The Kadic court
determined that certain universally condemned violations, such as slave
trading, war crimes, and genocide, violate customary international law
regardless of whether state or private actors commit them.39 Additionally,
the court held that "lesser" tortious acts such as official torture and
been successfully maintained under [the ATS,] ... which permits Federal district courts to hear
claims by aliens for torts committed 'in violation of the law of nations' .. and noted that 'the
Filartiga case has been met with general approval').
33. Flores, 414 F.3d at 247.
34. 70 F.3d 232, 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
35. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877 (2d Cir. 1980).
36. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239 ("[W]e hold that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as private individuals.").
37. Id. at 236-37. The "plaintiffs asserted causes of action for genocide, rape, forced prostitution
and impregnation, torture and other cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment, assault and battery, sex
and ethnic inequality, summary execution, and wrongful death" against Karazdic and the Bosnian-
Serb military forces that he controlled. Id. at 237.
38. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
39. Id.; see also Alan Frederick Enslen, Note, Filartiga's Offspring: The Second Circuit
Significantly Expands the Scope of the Alien Tort Claim Act with its Decision in Kadic v. Karazdic,
48 ALA. L. REV. 695, 696 (1997).
"summary execution," which are typically violations of customary law only
when they are undertaken by state actors or under the color of law, were
actionable under the ATS "without regard to state action, to the extent that
they were committed in pursuit of' one of the universally condemned
violations (e.g., genocide or war crimes). 40 Kadic therefore opened the door
for ATS litigation even wider: under exceptional circumstances involving a
small group of universally condemned violations of international law,
plaintiffs can file ATS claims against private, non-state actors in U.S. federal
courts.
4
'
The Kadic holding is particularly significant in the evolution of ATS
litigation because it has provided the basis for those cases involving non-
state entities, such as multinational corporations. 42  This development is
largely responsible for fueling the fire surrounding the ATS, because pre-
Kadic, the ATS's application was limited to a small set of generally
judgment-proof individual tortfeasors.43 Post-Kadic, however, the ATS can
potentially be applied to corporate defendants, and as a result, "the days of
symbolic judgments [have been left] behind. ' 44 The ATS now wields "true
deterrent effect" by having the ability to "hit[] ... a major player where it
hurts, both financially and in terms of public relations., 45  This has caused
alarm in corporate America and in the U.S. Administration, who fear that
successful suits against corporate defendants under the ATS could
discourage foreign investment, potentially bankrupt U.S. corporations, and
interfere with international, political, and economic relationships.46 In light
40. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244; see also Gabriel D. Pinilla, Note & Comment, Corporate Liability for
Human Rights Violations on Foreign Soil: A Historical and Prospective Analysis of the Alien Tort
Claims Controversy, 16 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 687, 694 (2004).
41. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 244; see also Pinilla, supra note 40, at 695 (noting that "Kadic brought
[ATS] jurisprudence to a new threshold by finding that state action was not required for actionability
in certain exceptional circumstances.").
42. Pinilla, supra note 40, at 695 (suggesting that Kadic's "line of thinking created the
intellectual momentum for Unocal and its evolving progeny"); see also Hagen & Michaels, supra
note 4 (providing examples of ATS cases involving corporate defendants); Stephens, supra note 24,
at 537-38.
43. See Stephens, supra note 24, at 536-38 (discussing successfully-litigated ATS claims).
44. Pinilla, supra note 40, at 700.
45. Id. "With Unocal and subsequently affirmative cases finally able to compellingly grip at
least some of the parties involved in theses nightmare violation scenarios, the ATCA seemed to
suddenly gnash a mouthful of menacingly proscriptive teeth." Id. at 695; see, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal
Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh "g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss
granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding parties may be liable under the ATCA for crimes
committed).
46. See, e.g., Gary Clyde Hufbauer, The Supreme Court Meets International Law: What's the
Sequel to Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain?, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 77, 85-86 (2004) (speculating
that corporate liability under the ATS could lead to asbestos-like litigation and the discouragement
of foreign investment); see also Reply Brief for the United States as Respondent Supporting
Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL 577654
(arguing that the ATS will "intrude on matters pertaining to the conduct of foreign affairs by the
political branches").
476
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of the growing debate regarding the scope and legitimacy of the ATS, the
Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari to hear the Sosa case could not
have come sooner.47
III. SOSA v. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
A. Case Summary
After informal extradition talks broke down, the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency ("DEA") enlisted petitioner Jos6 Francisco Sosa and several other
Mexican nationals to forcibly abduct respondent Humberto Alvarez-
Machain from Mexico in 1990 and bring him to the U.S. 48  The DEA
believed that Alvarez-Machain, a medical doctor allied with Mexican drug
traffickers, participated in the interrogation, torture and murder of DEA
agent Enrique Camarena-Salazar in 1985.4 9 Alvarez-Machain challenged his
criminal indictment in U.S. courts on the ground that he was kidnapped in
violation of the Extradition Treaty between the United States and Mexico. °
The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, and the Court concluded
that Alvarez-Machain's forcible abduction did not prohibit a trial in the
United States under its criminal laws.5 1 The case was remanded to the
district court for trial, where Alvarez-Machain was acquitted of the criminal
charges.2
Still unsatisfied, Alvarez-Machain sued the United States for false arrest
under the Federal Torts Claims Act ("FTCA") and DEA employee Sosa for
violating the law of nations under the ATS 53 The district court dismissed
the FTCA claim, but found in favor of Alvarez-Machain on the ATS claim
and awarded him damages.5 4 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower court's ATS judgment but reversed the FTCA holding.55 The
47. See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 247 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that as of 2003,
"[t]he Supreme Court [had] not yet addressed whether the [ATS] permits a cause of action for
violations of customary international law as that body of law has evolved since 1789, or ... whether
Filartiga's interpretation of the [ATS] is consistent with the Constitution.").
48. United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657 (1992).
49. Id. at 657 n.l.
50. Id. at 658.
51. Id. at 657.
52. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2746 (2004).
53. Id. at 2747.
54. Id.
55. Id.
477
Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard the case on March 30, 2004.56
The Sosa Court held that Alvarez-Machain could not recover (a) under the
FTCA since the alleged transgressions occurred across the border, placing
his case in the "foreign country" exception to the waiver of government
immunity;57 nor (b) under the ATS because a single detention of less than
one day did not violate a norm of customary international law so well
defined as to create a substantive cause of action. 8
B. The Sosa Standard
In evaluating whether Alvarez-Machain brought a valid claim under the
ATS, the Sosa Court articulated a long-awaited standard for ascertaining
substantive claims under the ATS. Prior to Sosa, it was generally accepted
that the ATS gave U.S. federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims brought
forth "by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."59 The controversy stemmed from a
dispute over first, whether the ATS was more than a jurisdictional grant, i.e.,
did it empower federal courts to recognize substantive claims that Congress
has not specifically identified as viable causes of action? And second, if the
ATS does empower courts to recognize substantive claims in violation of
international law, how does a court determine what constitutes a violation of
international law?
The Sosa Court directly settled the first flashpoint in the ATS debate.
The Court held that the ATS is indeed more than a jurisdictional grant, and
that the statute authorizes U.S. federal courts to recognize substantive
violations of a small number of well-settled violations of international law.6 °
The Court concluded:
[W]e agree that the [ATS] is in terms only jurisdictional, [but] we
think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law
of nations and recognized at common law . . ..6 [The ATS
presumably allowed] federal courts [to] entertain claims once the
jurisdictional grant was on the books, because torts in violation of
the law of nations would have been recognized within the common
law of the time [and] ... [t]here is too much in the historical record
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2754. "We do not believe.., that the limited, implicit sanction to entertain the handful
of international law cum common law claims understood in 1789 should be taken as authority to
recognize the right of action asserted by [Alvarez-Machain] here." Id.
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
60. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2754.
61. Id.
478
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to believe that Congress would have enacted the ATS only to leave
it lying fallow indefinitely.
62
The Court then turned its attention to the second hotly-debated issue in
ATS litigation: what constitutes a violation of international law sufficient to
give rise to a claim under the ATS? In answer to this question, the Sosa
Court set forth the following two-fold standard. A claim rests on a tort in
violation of international law and is actionable under the ATS where it: (1)
rests on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world;
and (2) is defined with specificity comparable to those violations of
international law that existed at the time the ATS was enacted.63 With
regard to the second prong, the Sosa Court noted that it considered only
three offenses to have been recognized in the eighteenth-century as
violations of the law of nations: offenses against ambassadors, violations of
safe conduct, and individual actions arising out of prize captures and
piracy.64 The natural follow-up inquiry to the second component is: what
qualities made these torts violations of international law and defined them
with Sosa's requisite specificity?
1. Violation of Customary International Law
Sosa's requirement that the claim be based on a "norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world" arguably means that the claim
must rest on a violation of customary international law.65 There is no litmus
test for determining what constitutes customary international law,66 nor is
62. Id. at 2755, 2758-59. The Sosa Court rejected the notion that the "ATS was stillborn because
there could be no claim for relief without a further statute expressly authorizing adoption of causes
of action." Id. at 2755.
63. Id. at 2761-62 ("(Wie think courts should require any claim based on the present-day law of
nations to rest on a norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with
a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized.").
64. See supra note 11.
65. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761.
66. This article does not attempt to define an international norm in the absolute sense or try to
establish an exhaustive list of norms, but focuses on ascertaining Sosa's calculus for making this
determination. There has been extensive discussion and debate over how the "law of nations"
should be defined or what constitutes an "international norm." In that there is no single source, set
of participants, or institutional arrangement for the creation and management of international law,
the "norms" that comprise international law are rather amorphous. See Jordan J. Paust, The
Significance and Determination of Customary International Human Rights Law: The Complex
Nature, Sources and Evidences of Customary Human Rights, 25 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 147 (1996)
[hereinafter J. Paust-Customary International Law].
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there an exhaustive list of recognized customary international norms.67 The
most common definition of a customary international norm, however, is the
one adopted by the International Court of Justice.68 It stipulates that to be
customary international law, a norm must be: "reflected in consistent state
practice," and "adhered to out of a sense of legal obligation (opiniojuris).69
The first component of the definition is known as the "practice prong;"
i.e., the norm must be reflected in the pattern of practice among nations.7°
This is evidenced both by what states do, as well as what they say. 7 1 State
practice can be ascertained by a state's commitment to adhere to
international conventions, treaties, accords, and other binding instruments,
its participation in international forums or regional bodies that discuss
human rights issues, and its actual conduct.72
Second, to constitute customary international law, a norm must
command a sense of opinio juris.7 3 Opinio juris is the notion that nations
not only subscribe to a customary international norm in practice, but that
they do so out of a shared sense of legal obligation.74 This does not mean
that countries merely feel morally or politically obligated to respect the
67. See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 18 (2d ed. 2001) (noting
that "[lI]egal authorities have formulated numerous approaches and theories to determine whether a
norm has achieved the status of customary international law"). A generally accepted list of
customary international norms includes genocide, slavery or slave trade, the murder or causing the
disappearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment,
prolonged arbitrary detention, systematic racial discrimination, and a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(a)-(g) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
68. See S. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 67, at 18.
69. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 102; J. Paust-Customary International Law,
supra note 66, at 148 (noting that "nearly all agree that customary human rights law has two primary
components... (1) patterns of practice or behavior, and (2) patterns of legal expectation.").
70. J. Paust-Customary International Law, supra note 66, at 148.
71. See J. Ratner, supra note 3, at 117. "It is sometimes suggested that state practice consists
only of what states do, not of what they say.., the better view.. . appears to be that state practice
consists not only of what states do, but also of what they say." Id. (quoting Peter Malanczuk,
Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN
CONTEXT 74 (Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston eds., 2d ed. 2000)) (emphasis added).
72. Id. at 116-19 (noting that in certain instances, "official state pronouncements [are] of [even]
greater evidentiary significance than reports of contrary state practice... ").
73. See S. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 67, at 18; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, §
102 (defining opiniojuris and the role it plays in ascertaining customary international law).
[A] practice that is generally followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does
not contribute to customary law. A practice initially followed by states as a matter of
courtesy or habit may become law when states generally come to believe that they are
under a legal obligation to comply with it.
Id.
74. RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 102; see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 26 (Prof I Books Ltd. 6th ed. 1976) (1947) ("It is not sufficient to show that
States follow habitually a certain line of conduct, either in doing or not doing something. To prove
the existence of a rule of international customary law, it is necessary to establish that States act in
this way because they recognise a legal obligation to this effect.").
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international norm, nor that that all states universally adhere to it; it means
that all states are both legally expected and bound to adhere to the norm.75
Opinio juris can be measured both by how widespread the expectation of
adherence is, as well as how intensely held the norm is in the international
community.7 6 The best example of norms which possess requisite opinio
juris may be those known as jus cogens norms. Jus cogens is Latin for
"compelling law,"" and jus cogens norms are a subset of customary
international law that command near universal adherence and respect.78
"The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties defines jus cogens as
'[norms] accepted and recognized by the international community... from
which no derogation is permitted. ,,79 Although there is debate as to which
norms constitute jus cogens norms-as there seems to be with regard to all
attempts to define "international law"--the Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations provides the following examples ofjus cogens violations:
piracy, slave trade, genocide and war crimes.8° This discussion is not
undertaken to suggest that the Sosa Court limited actionable ATS claims to
those based on violations of jus cogens norms. As peremptory and
universally accepted international legal norms, jus cogens are simply an
example of the types of "specific, universal, and obligatory" claims 81 which
the Sosa Court would at a minimum hold to constitute actionable ATS
violations. For its first prong, the Court only required that the "law of
nations . . . rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and [be] defined with a specificity comparable to the features
75. See J. Paust-Customary International Law, supra note 66, at 151.
Patterns of human practice need only be general, not uniform, and patterns of opiniojuris
need only be generally shared.., a particular nation-state might disagree whether a
particular human right is customary and its governmental elites might even violate such a
norm, but it would still be bound if the norm is supported by patterns of generally shared
legal expectation and generally conforming behavior extant in the community.
Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id.
77. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 695 (8th ed. 2004).
78. See J. Paust-Customary International Law, supra note 66, at 153-55.
79. Tawny Aine Bridgeford, Imputing Human Rights Obligations on Multinational
Corporations: The Ninth Circuit Strikes Again in Judicial Activism, 18 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1009,
1023 (2003) (citing the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 332); see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 331 cmt. e (noting that jus cogens are
"peremptory rules of international law that are of superior status and cannot be affected by treaty").
80. RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 404. This is not an exhaustive list but is meant to provide
examples of the types of norms that qualify asjus cogens.
81. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004) (citing In re Estate of Marcos, 25
F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
of the 18th-century paradigms. 82 This analysis now turns to examining the
eighteenth-century paradigms and those features which defined them with a
requisite degree of specificity.
2. Requisite Degree of Specificity
It was this narrow set of violations of the law of nations [offenses
against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and piracy],
admitting of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening
serious consequences in international affairs, that was probably on
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort. 3
With regard to the Sosa standard's second stipulation, this article
proposes that offenses against ambassadors, violations of safe conducts, and
individual actions arising out of prize captures and piracy were singled out
as violations of international law because they shared two features: they
were narrowly defined; and each involved cases where an individual's
conduct carried ramifications for international peace and security-and as
such, nations universally and obligatorily recognized them.
i. Offenses Against Ambassadors and Violations of Safe Passage
In May of 1784, a French national verbally and physically assaulted the
Secretary of the French Legion, who was visiting Philadelphia.84 Seemingly
innocuous by today's standards, the "Marbois incident" could have led to
armed conflict between the fledgling United States and France. 85 At the
time, attacking an ambassador was an affront not only against his person, but
to his nation's sovereignty-and the U.S. government did not have a
mechanism in place for an alien to seek recourse against his tortfeasor in
U.S. courts.86 Shaken by the incident, Congress decried its inability to
"'cause infractions of treaties, or of the law of nations to be punished,' 8 7
and called for state legislatures to provide retribution against those who
committed such torts as the "violation of safe conducts or passports" or
"infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers."88
Historical writings indicate that in an effort to avoid jeopardizing its
82. Id. at 2761-62 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 2756.
84. Id. at 2757.
85. Id. at 2756.
86. Id. at 2757.
87. Id. at 2756 (quoting JAMES MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60
(E. Scott ed., 1893)).
88. Id.
[Vol. 33: 469, 2006] The Sosa Standard
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
relationships with states around the world, Congress incorporated the ATS
into the Judiciary Act of 1789 in part to provide recourse for offenses against
ambassadors and violations of safe conduct.89
ii. Piracy
Piracy is the historical tort most commonly referenced in human rights
litigation. 90  Even Sosa cites with approval to the Filartiga court's
conclusion that "for purposes of civil liability, the [human rights abuser] has
become-like the pirate and slave trader before him-hostis humani generis,
an enemy of all mankind." 9' Piracy has often been deemed a universally-
recognized violation of international law on one of two grounds-either that
it was so heinous and severe an offense that it is "universally cognizable, '9
or that it is a violation of international law because the high seas are outside
of any traditional jurisdictional category.93 Piracy's purported heinousness
and resulting subjection to "universal" jurisdiction seem to make it a clear
candidate for a uniformly-accepted violation of international law, and as
such, a good model for ascertaining modem actionable human rights claims
under international law. The underlying bases for its special treatment,
however, are flawed. First, in placing piracy in its proper historical context,
one discovers that piracy was merely robbery and possibly murder at sea;9 4 it
was certainly not regarded with the same moral repugnance that genocide or
war crimes are today. 95 Second, pirates did in fact fall within at least one
89. See id. at 2757.
90. See Eugene Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction 's Hollow
Foundation, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 183, 185 (2004) (noting that the piracy analogy was used in the
Nazi War Crimes Tribunals, the trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the Filartiga decision).
91. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
92. Kontorovich, supra note 90, at 185.
93. Id. at 190.
94. See id. at 186-87. In reality, pirates engaged in the same behavior as state-sponsored
privateering: the armed robbery of civilian shipping. Id. (explaining that privateering only differed
from piracy only in that a privateer operated under a license issued by a sovereign, with whom he
split the proceeds-which implies that piracy could not have been altogether heinous if there was a
way in which the same activity could be legally authorized).
95. Seeid.at210-11.
Torture and genocide evoke a visceral repugnance. The repugnance would not be
diminished if the torture or genocide had the blessing of nations, generals, or religious
authorities. Yet clearly this is not how piracy was regarded by the nations of the world,
for a document signed by a third-tier official of a second-rate province could transform a
universally punishable pirate into an innocent privateer. This disparate treatment is
incompatible with the kind of deep revulsion that, according to the piracy analogy, has
always motivated universal jurisdiction.
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traditional basis of jurisdiction,96 and were not "jurisdiction-less" because
they operated on the international high seas.97 For example, pirates who
attacked ships that sailed under the flag of a particular sovereign nation
would be subject to that nation's quasi-territorial jurisdiction.98
Alternatively, because those on board were nationals of a sovereign state, the
pirates who attacked them would have fallen within that country's passive
personality jurisdiction.99
Arguably, then, piracy was not singled out as a violation of international
law for its "heinous" nature, or even because it involved the commission of
torts outside any nation's jurisdictional reach. It is more likely that piracy
was distinguished as a violation of the law of nations for reasons similar to
offenses against ambassadors and violation of safe conduct. Because it
interfered with trade and commerce, and injured sovereign states' property
and persons, piracy, like the other offenses, involved torts committed by
individuals that carried ramifications for international peace and security.
Finally, in addition to the fact that all three of Sosa's historical offenses
shared the common feature of guarding against destabilizing international
relations, there is proof that these offenses were widely, if not universally,
regarded as violations of international law. The "violation of safe conducts,
infringements on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy" were listed as
specific offenses against the law of nations in England's criminal code at the
time the ATS was passed. 00 This not only demonstrates that these torts
were widely recognized, but also exemplifies their specific nature.
Blackstone did not describe amorphous crimes such as "persecution" or
"oppression" as violations of the law of nations-nor did he identify
common crimes like "theft" or "murder" as offenses of international norms;
he instead focused on narrowly-defined torts committed by individual actors,
which had international consequences and were universally recognized.101
Id.
96. See S. RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 67, at 160-62 for a discussion of the four traditional
bases of jurisdiction: territory (right of a state to apply its laws over acts committed within its
territorial boundaries); nationality (right of a state to exercise jurisdiction over an offender who is
one of its nationals regardless of where the conduct occurred); protective (jurisdiction is exercised
for cases in which extraterritorial conduct would have potentially harmful consequences for the
interests of the state); and passive personality (where the victim of the offense is a national of the
state seeking to exercise jurisdiction).
97. See Kontorovich, supra note 90, at 210-11. The notion that pirates were subject to universal
jurisdiction is derived from the fact that any nation could try and summarily execute a pirate,
regardless of the pirate's nationality or where he was apprehended, as long as it was on the high seas.
See id. at 190.
98. Seeid.at210.
99. Id. at 190.
100, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2756, 2759 (2004) (referencing WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68).
101. Seeid.at2760.
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The Sosa Court's stipulation that an actionable claim must be "defined
with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms"
can thus be construed to mean that a claim need not only be based on a
customary international norm, but that it must be a narrowly tailored,
specific guard against individual actions that bear consequences for
international peace and security. 1
02
3. Applying the Standard to Facts of Sosa
The Sosa Court began its inquiry into whether Alvarez-Machain's
arbitrary detention claim was actionable under the ATS by undertaking the
first component of the Sosa standard-a customary international law
analysis. The Court explained that Alvarez-Machain's claim must be
"gauged against the current state of international law, looking to those
sources we have long, albeit cautiously, recognized," 103 and held that:
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or
legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs
and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the
works of jurists ... [which] are resorted to by judicial tribunals ...
for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is. 1°4
To ascertain whether arbitrary detention constituted a violation of a
customary international norm, the Sosa Court looked to Alvarez-Machain's
evidence that such a norm is supported by state practice and opinio juris.10 5
Alvarez-Machain cited the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
("Declaration"), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
("ICCPR"), and a survey of several national constitutions in answer to this
inquiry. 106 Alvarez-Machain asserted that his kidnapping was an "arbitrary
arrest" within the meaning of the Declaration and the ICCPR, and that a
survey of many nations shows that there is a generally recognized norm
102. See id. at 2761-62.
103. Id. at 2766.
104. Id. at 2766-67 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)) (emphasis added).
105. See id. at 2767.
106. Id. at 2767-68 (citing Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N.
Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 19, 1966); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Human Rights in the Context of
Criminal Justice: Identifying International Procedural Protections and Equivalent Protections in
National Constitutions, 3 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 235, 260-61 (1993)).
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against arbitrary detention.' °7 The Sosa Court found this evidence wholly
inadequate to support Alvarez-Machain's claim.' 
08
First, with regard to the state practice prong of the customary
international law analysis, Alvarez-Machain cited valid sources of law-
international conventions and state constitutions." 9  The Court noted,
however, that the sources of law had "little utility under the standard set out
in [its] opinion" because they were not directly on point, nor sufficiently
concrete. ° The national constitutions that Alvarez-Machain cited, for
example, only refer to arbitrary detention at a "high level of generality.""'
In addition, there is even counter-evidence to Alvarez-Machain's position.
The Court cited the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, which states,
with regard to customary international human rights law, that a "state
violates international law if, as a matter of state policy, it practices,
encourages, or condones ... prolonged arbitrary detention.' 112 The Court
concluded: this implies that "[a]ny credible invocation of a principle against
arbitrary detention that the civilized world accepts as binding customary
international law requires a factual basis beyond relatively brief detention in
excess of positive authority.""' 3
Second, and closely tied to the state practice issue, the Court stated that
Alvarez-Machain's evidence does not demonstrate the requisite opiniojuris
with regard to the arbitrary detention. 14  The Court explained that the
"[d]eclaration does not of its own force impose obligations . . . of
international law," and that the "United States ratified the [ICCPR] on the
express understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not itself
create obligations enforceable in the federal courts.""' The Court clearly
rejected Alvarez-Machain's assertion that nations feel a legal obligation to
enforce international norms against arbitrary detention." 
6
Alvarez-Machain failed to prove that arbitrary detention is evidenced by
either state practice or opinio juris sufficient to establish it as a customary
international norm. His claim did not meet even the first component of the
Sosa standard.
Turning to the standard's second prong--determining whether the norm
is defined with the requisite degree of specificity-the Court not surprisingly
107. Id. at 2768.
108. Id. at 2767-69.
109. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for a discussion of the type of evidence that
demonstrates state practice.
110. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2767-68.
111. Id. at 2768 n.27.
112. Id. at 2768 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 67, § 702) (emphasis added).
113. Id. at 2768-69 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 2767.
115. Id.
116. See id. at 2769.
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concluded that Alvarez-Machain's claim came up short on this count as
well.117 The Court did not belabor this point since it had already rejected
Alvarez-Machain's claim on its failure to qualify as customary international
norm. It noted, though, that even were the claim to pass muster as a
customary norm, it still would have had to pass the more stringent standard
of demonstrating the degree of certainty and specificity which characterized
Blackstone's historical paradigms.l"
8
IV. IMPACT: APPLYING THE SOSA STANDARD IN FUTURE LITIGATION
The Sosa decision will have varying implications for ATS cases
depending on whether they are litigating "traditional" claims, such as torture
or genocide, which have already passed judicial muster," 9 or whether they
are breaking new ground, such as seeking to hold a corporation liable for
cultural genocide stemming from the company's degradation of the
environment. 120 A brief survey of the cases adjudicated post-Sosa supports
this position. For example, on the one hand, Alvaro Rafael Saravia was held
liable under the ATS using Sosa's standard for extrajudicial killing and
crimes against humanity for his role in the assassination of the El Salvadoran
archbishop Oscar Romero and in carrying out other atrocities against the El
Salvadoran people.' 2' On the other hand, the Southern District of New York
held that Nigerian nationals, who alleged serious injury from an
experimental drug administered by the U.S. corporation Pfizer in violation
of international law, failed to state an adequate claim under the ATS
according to the Sosa standard.
22
ATS watchers are arguably the most interested in Sosa's impact on the
latter set of "non-traditional" cases largely involving corporate defendants
117. See id. "Whatever may be said for the broad principle [Alvarez-Machain] advances... it
expresses an aspiration that exceeds any binding customary rule having the specificity we require."
Id.
118. Id.
Even the Restatement's limits are only the beginning of the enquiry, because although it
is easy to say that some policies of prolonged arbitrary detentions are so bad that those
who enforce them become enemies of the human race, it may be harder to say which
policies cross that line with the certainty afforded by Blackstone's three common law
offenses.
Id.
119. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232
(2d Cir. 1995).
120. See Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
121. See Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112 (E.D. Cal. 2004).
122. See Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 8118 (WHP), 2005 WL 1870811, slip op. at *18
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005).
and "new" substantive claims. This section of the article consequently
focuses on the Sosa decision's implications for cases involving U.S.
corporate defendants, by first identifying those issues the Supreme Court
declined to address that could pose practical problems for lower courts
trying to adjudicate novel ATS claims, and then by analyzing the facts of the
most well-known corporate ATS case-Doe I v. Unocal Corp.-using the
Sosa standard.
123
In September of 2002, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in
Unocal that plaintiffs' claims were actionable under the ATS. 124 A few
months later in February of 2003, the Ninth Circuit granted an en banc
rehearing of the case, but that decision was delayed pending the Supreme
Court's decision in Sosa.15 Then, post-Sosa, the Unocal case was dismissed
upon the parties' motion and the en banc decision was never administered.
126
Unocal itself will therefore never be decided in the wake of Sosa; the case,
however, represents a growing trend of suing corporate defendants under the
ATS, such that the unresolved issues in the case are sure to be litigated down
the road.22 The Unocal case is consequently an appropriate case study to
test the Sosa standard's practical effect.
A. Practical Challenges
The challenge in proving that modem-day human rights violations are
actionable under the Sosa standard is two-fold. First, the Sosa Court
identified several factors that may limit a court's ability to recognize an
actionable claim under the ATS. 128 It held that courts hearing ATS claims
should consider: (a) "the practical consequences of making [a particular]
cause [of action] available to litigants in the federal courts;"' 129 (b) "whether
123. See 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to
dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Pinilla, supra note 40, at 699.
124. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 956.
125. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978, 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d
708 (9th Cir. 2005).
126. Motion to dismiss by the parties granted by Unocal, 403 F.3d at 708.
127. Pinilla, supra note 40, at 700 (noting that the real ability to collect on large damage awards
against U.S. corporations means that the ATS could become a true deterrent for individuals and
entities that violate international norms-a possibility that has made them popular defendants under
the statute).
128. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 (2004).
129. Id. (emphasis added). This limitation factored heavily into the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Sosa. In rejecting Alvarez-Machain's request to recognize arbitrary detention as a binding
customary norm, the Court emphasized that the practical effects of such a move make it an
implausible suggestion:
[Alvarez-Machain] cites nothing to justify the federal courts in taking his broad rule as
the predicate for a federal lawsuit, for its implications would be breathtaking. His rule
would support a cause of action in federal court for any arrest, anywhere in the world,
unauthorized by the law of the jurisdiction in which it took place ....
Id. at 2768.
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international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given
norm to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as
a corporation or [an] individual;"' 30 (c) whether the claimant needs to "have
exhausted any remedies available in the domestic legal system, and perhaps
in other fora such as international claims tribunals;"' 31 and (d) whether the
case demands "deference to the political branches.' ' 132 The Court, however,
did not explain how a court should factor these into its decision-making
calculus, which means that these issues are sure to be extensively litigated. 133
Second, the Court held that ATS advocates must be prepared to make
the argument that a particular violation is defined within Sosa's heightened
specificity requirement. 3 4  This means, as previously discussed, that an
actionable violation must be narrowly tailored and have ramifications for
international peace, stability, or security-like the eighteenth-century
paradigms. 35  The case can be made that in today's global environment,
egregious human rights violations in any part of the world threaten the
stability of the international community. To name only a few, systematic
human rights violations can give rise to such internationally destabilizing
130. Id. at 2766 n.20. The Sosa Court suggested that the jury is still out as to whether a private
actor or entity can be liable for violating an international norm, and compared Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791-95 (C.A.D.C. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) with Kadic v.
Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995). Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.20. Cases such as Unocal
and Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 2005),
have decidedly held that individuals and "corporations may be held liable under international law for
violations ofjus cogens norms." Talisman, 374 F. Supp. 2d at 333. The Talisman court further
noted that "the Second Circuit had frequently confronted ATS cases involving corporate defendants
and had never found itself to lack jurisdiction because corporations could not be liable under
international law." Id. (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp.
2d 289, 313-15 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); see also Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000); Bigio v. Coca-Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440
(2d Cir. 2000); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
131. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21. There has already been a split in opinion among the lower
courts as to whether a plaintiff is required to exhaust his remedies prior to bringing an ATS claim.
Compare Doe v. Saravia, 348 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1157 (E.D. Cal. 2004) ("Plaintiffs asserting claims
under the [ATS] are not required to exhaust their remedies in the state in which the alleged
violations of customary international law occurred."), with Enahoro v. Abubakar, 408 F.3d 877, 886
(7th Cir. 2005) (holding that it believes Sosa intended to make exhaustion of remedies a procedural
requirement for pursuing an ATS claim).
132. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21.
133. See Leading Case: B. Alien Tort Statute, 118 HARV. L. REV. 446, 454-55 (2004) (noting that
"the Court's analysis offers few practical cues to lower courts that must perform the inquiry"); see
also supra notes 130-31 for a discussion of disparate court holdings regarding these issues.
134. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
135. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Sosa standard "Requisite Degree of
Specificity."
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effects as displacing local populations to neighboring countries, 11 6
destroying natural resources that lead to economic and environmental
devastation,137 and fostering the political instability that cultivates breeding
grounds for terrorism and armed conflict. 3 8 Defendants will certainly
attempt to attenuate the role that any alleged underlying human rights abuses
play in international stability. And plaintiffs must overcome U.S. courts'
reticence to get involved with transgressions committed within another
country's borders that do not have direct implications for U.S. security
interests and foreign policy. 39
B. Case Study: Sosa's Implications for Corporate Defendants
The intricacies of these challenges and Sosa's implications for corporate
defendants are effectively illustrated in the Unocal case. 4 ° The issue in
Unocal was whether the Unocal Corporation could be held liable for the
human rights violations committed by the Myanmar military in the course of
136. See Eric Rosand, The Right to Return Under International Law Following Mass Dislocation:
The Bosnia Precedent?, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1091, 1138 (1998) (noting that the "return of Bosnian
refugees and displaced persons [was] key to lasting stability in Bosnia [and that] [s]ecuring this right
on behalf of refugees and displaced persons and recreating the multi-ethnic communities that
characterized Bosnia before the war is important. . . for re-establishing political stability in the
region.").
137. See Franz Xavier Perrez, The Efficiency of Cooperation: A Functional Analysis of
Sovereignty, 15 ARIz. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 515, 571-72 (1998).
[Large development] projects of undemocratic governments involve not only enormous
environmental impacts, but entail tremendous social changes, dislocation and uprooting
of communities, destruction of minority cultures and civilizations, and individual human
rights violations... produc[ing] environmental refugees all over the world... [which] in
turn causes new tensions and contributes to the aggravation of already existing
conflicts.. despair and extremism, thereby, indirectly contributing to instability and
tension.
Id.
138. See Jordan J. Paust, Tolerance in the Age of Increased Interdependence, 56 FLA. L. REv. 987,
1001 (2004).
[L]oyalty, nationalism, and patriotism without tolerance and effective guarantees of
human rights can foster impermissible acts of nonstate terrorism. Conversely, the
promotion of tolerance and human rights can deflate or defeat various forms of social
violence and terrorism. Impermissible terrorism necessarily violates human rights of both
direct and indirect victims that are of international concern whether engaged in by state or
nonstate actors. Thus, when human rights are protected, terrorism is set back.
Id.
139. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2776 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia demonstrated this
reticence when he stated, "[tlhe notion that a law of nations, redefined to mean the consensus of
states on any subject, can be used by a private citizen to control a sovereign's treatment of its own
citizens within its own territory is a 20th-century invention of internationalist law professors and
human-rights advocates." Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARv. L. REv. 816, 831-37 (1997)).
140. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
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constructing a gas pipeline in the Myanmar Republic (formerly known as
Burma).' 4' There were two layers of analysis involved in determining
Unocal's justiciability under the ATS in light of Sosa: (a) whether the
primary alleged tort-forced labor-is a violation of the law of nations; and
(b) whether an actor who aids or abets those who commit human rights
violations can be held liable via civil tort principles of agency liability, or
whether aiding and abetting must qualify as an international law violation in
and of itself, and, if so, whether aiding and abetting those who commit
human rights violations indeed constitutes such a violation. 42
1. Background
A new military government took over the country formerly known as
Burma and renamed it Myanmar in 1988.143 Shortly thereafter, the
Myanmar Military launched a state-owned company called the Myanmar Oil
and Gas Enterprise to manufacture and sell the country's oil and gas
resources. 144 Consequently, in 1992, when the Unocal Corporation acquired
a 28% interest in a large pipeline project ("Project"), whose purpose was to
move natural gas from the coast of Myanmar to Thailand, Unocal's
subsidiary company effectively teamed up with the Myanmar Military's
company in a joint venture. 145 The current lawsuit is rooted in this context.
Myanmar villagers who live along the pipeline route allege that the military
committed human rights abuses ranging from forced labor to murder, rape,
and torture in connection with the Project.146  Purportedly, the military
committed these atrocities while providing security and other support
services for the Project (e.g., supervising the construction of helipads for oil
executives to visit construction sites and clearing roads along the pipeline
route). 47 Although the district court initially awarded summary judgment in
favor of the defendant Unocal, the court of appeals reversed the lower
court's summary judgment order with respect to the ATS claims based on
forced labor, murder and rape. 4  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
141. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 936.
142. Id. at 945-46.
143. Id. at 937.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 942-43 (citing plaintiff testimony alleging that villagers from the Tenasserim region,
the rural area through which the pipeline was built, were forced to work on the construction of the
pipeline and associated infrastructure or be subjected to murder, rape, and torture).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 962-63.
determined that the alleged torts were jus cogens violations and were,
therefore, violations of the law of nations under the ATS. 149  The
determination that the offenses constituted not only violations of customary
international law but also jus cogens violations was particularly significant
because in the wake of Kadic, non-state actors can be held liable for jus
cogens violations. 5° The door was therefore open for Unocal, a private
entity, to be held potentially liable for aiding and abetting the Myanmar
Military responsible for carrying out those violations. 5'
2. Forced Labor Claim
Pre-Sosa, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals undertook an abbreviated
analysis as to whether forced labor qualified as an actionable norm under the
ATS and concluded that it was.' 5 2 The court determined that "forced labor is
so widely condemned" that it not only qualified as a violation of a
customary international norm, but that "it has achieved the status of a jus
cogens violation."'153  As such, the court had no trouble determining that
forced labor constituted an actionable ATS claim.1
54
Post-Sosa, the court would be required to undertake a far more extensive
analysis. In compliance with the first prong of the Sosa standard, the Unocal
court would need to ascertain whether forced labor constitutes a violation of
customary international law. 55 This means it would look to evidence of
state practice and opinio juris that supports recognizing an international
norm against forced labor.'5 6  To this end, the court could follow the
Supreme Court's guidance in United States v. Smith and examine traditional
sources of international law, such as: 17 the works of jurists, the general
usage and practice of nations, and judicial decisions recognizing and
enforcing that law.' 55
149. Id. at 945.
150. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995).
151. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 939.
152. See id. at 945.
153. Id.
154. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945. This conclusion has been subject to extensive criticism that the
Ninth Circuit circumvented actually analyzing whether or not forced labor qualifies as a violation of
the law of nations or rises to the level ofjus cogens norm in and of itself. See Bridgeford, supra note
79, at 1039.
155. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion about determining customary international law
through evidence of state practice and opiniojuris.
156. Id.
157. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
158. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2765-66 (2004) (citing Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
at 160-61). In the same discussion, the Sosa Court explained an ATS "claim must be gauged against
the current state of international law, looking to those sources we have long, albeit cautiously,
recognized." Id. at 2766; see also supra Part IV.B.3 and accompanying text for Sosa's discussion of
determining customary international norms.
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The Unocal court would find that forced labor has been condemned
under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Agreement for the
Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, and the International
Labor Organization Convention Number Twenty-Nine, which the U.S
Department of Labor recognizes as setting forth an internationally-accepted
definition of "forced labor."' 59
In addition, U.S. courts hearing cases involving World War II-era
Japanese forced labor claims equated forced labor with "slavery" for
purposes of determining ATS liability-and as such, identified forced labor
as ajus cogens violation. 160
Based on this evidence, which includes international declarations and
conventions as well as judicial decisions enforcing the laws that they
embody, the court would probably conclude that it is the practice of most
states to recognize a norm against forced labor, and that nations feel a sense
of legal obligation to adhere to that norm. Forced labor, consequently,
would meet the first prong of the Sosa standard.
The Sosa Court, however, mandated that any actionable ATS claim
must satisfy an additional requirement. 6 1 It must be defined with the degree
of "specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms...
,,162 This means that the norm must be narrowly tailored and properly
recognized as an international norm due to its ramifications for international
peace and stability.163 First, forced labor is indeed narrowly tailored; as the
U.S. Department of Labor indicates, there are seven easily identifiable
categories of behavior that constitute forced labor violations. 64 They are
slavery and abductions, compulsory participation in public works projects,
159. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A(III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/8 10 (Dec. 12, 1948); Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the
Major War Criminals of the European Axis, and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art.
6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280; see also International Labour Organisation ("ILO") Convention
No. 29 (1930), available at United States Department of Labor, International Labor Standards:
Forced Labor, http://www.dol.gov/ilab/webmils/intllaborstandards/forcedlabor.html [hereinafter
U.S. Dep't of Labor-Forced Labor] (last visited Sept. 14, 2005) (setting forth the "international
standard on forced labor").
160. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing In re World War 11 Era
Japanese Forced Labor Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2001); Iwanowa v. Ford Motor Co.,
67 F. Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999) (concluding that "forced labor violates the law of nations")), reh g
granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
161. Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761-62.
162. Id. at 2759 (referencing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68).
163. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of the Sosa standard's "requisite degree of
specificity."
164. See U.S. Dep't of Labor-Forced Labor, supra note 159.
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mandatory forced labor in remote areas, bonded labor, involuntary labor
resulting from trafficking in persons, domestic workers in involuntary labor
situations, and prison labor and rehabilitation through work. 165 Because it is
specifically defined and limited to these applications, recognizing forced
labor under the ATS would not give rise to the kind of far-reaching practical
consequences that would accompany recognizing a broader more ambiguous
claim, such as arbitrary detention.
166
Second, a fair argument can be made that forced labor indeed carries
implications for international relations and security concerns. For example,
if a U.S. corporation, such as Unocal, is responsible for the oppression of
another country's citizens, it could strain U.S. ties with that nation, as well
as subject the U.S. to ridicule by the international community at large.167 It
is difficult to say with certainty what the Supreme Court considers
"specificity" commensurate with that possessed by the eighteenth-century
paradigms, but it would seem that forced labor would pass this prong of the
test and join torture, extrajudicial killing, war crimes, and genocide as an
actionable claim under the ATS. 168
165. Id.
166. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2768 (noting that Alvarez-Machain's claim failed in part due to the
practical implications of recognizing such a vague and wide-reaching standard as arbitrary
detention).
167. See Erin L. Borg, Sharing the Blame for September Eleventh: The Case for a New Law to
Regulate the Activities of American Corporations Abroad, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 607, 609
(2003).
General accusations by human rights organizations and watchdog groups accuse
American multinational corporations (MNCs) operating abroad of engaging in unfair
labor practices such as low wages and poor working conditions, employing child labor,
destroying the environment, bribing foreign officials, and even supporting terrorists in
order to permit smooth operation and increase profit margins. As the activities of
American MNCs abroad have grown to great proportions, they have become the new de
facto ambassadors for America in the twenty-first century. Their actions abroad reflect
poorly on American culture and society. More importantly, their often extensive actions
and involvement in foreign countries can prove detrimental to U.S. foreign policy
interests.
Id.
168. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that even the U.S. government, in the supplemental
brief it filed amicus curiae in the Unocal case following the Sosa decision, implicitly conceded that
forced labor is a viable claim under the ATS. See Supplemental Brief for the United States of
America as Amicus Curiae, Doe v. Unocal Corp., Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628 (9th Cir. Aug. 25,
2004), available at http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/dojunocalbrief.pdf [hereinafter Unocal
Supplemental Brief].
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Furthermore, forced labor's analogous link to an accepted jus cogens
violation-slavery-in combination with forced labor's "specific, universal
and obligatory" nature in its own right, may indeed raise the violation tojus
cogens status. 16 9  As such, forced labor would qualify as an offense for
which state action is not required. 170  In the spirit of Kadic and subsequent
cases such as Talisman,' 17 Unocal could thus be held liable for forced labor
violations under the ATS as a private entity. 172
3. Aiding and Abetting Claim
The analysis of the Unocal case does not end with the forced labor
determination. In Unocal, there is an added dimension to the pending
claim-the plaintiffs did not allege that the defendant Unocal directly
carried out human rights violations, including forced labor, but instead
argued that Unocal should be held liable for aiding and abetting the actor
responsible for the atrocities, which in this case was the Myanmar
military.'73 The Unocal plaintiffs' aiding and abetting argument entered
uncharted territory in ATS litigation in that it marked the first time plaintiffs
filed a claim against a defendant other than the tortfeasor who was directly
169. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text for a discussion ofjus cogens norms.
170. Id.
171. See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239-41 (2d Cir. 1995); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v.
Talisman Energy, Inc., 374 F. Supp. 2d 331, 333 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); see also Pinilla, supra note 40, at
694. The court's rationale was that international law can apply to private actors for certain
universally condemned violations, i.e., those rising to the level of jus cogens violations, which
include offenses such as genocide, slavery and war crimes. Id. Note as well that the Sosa Court
mentioned that the private actor liability issue has not yet been fully reconciled, and did not overturn
Kadic or preclude a corporation from being held individually liable for international law violations.
Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766.
172. In the context of Unocal, this entire discussion may be moot, since Unocal allegedly acted
via the Myanmar military-a state actor. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937 (9th Cir.
2002), reh 'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir.
2005). There may be cases that arise down the road, however, wherein plaintiffs may seek to invoke
non-state actor liability to hold corporations liable for forced labor violations. See Unocal, 395 F.3d
at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring). Ninth Circuit Judge Reinhardt, in his Unocal concurrence,
proposed that the state-actor requirement andjus cogens debate is irrelevant to the facts of the case
on the ground that the underlying tort, forced labor, is a violation of customary international law, the
Myanmar military (a state actor) committed the tort, and Unocal is liable based on federal common
law tort principles. See id. at 963-65. From Judge Reinhardt's standpoint, there is no need to get
into private actor liability for the violation of a jus cogens norm at all. Id. at 963. Instead, the
plaintiffs need only demonstrate that forced labor constitutes a violation of customary international
law. Id. at 964.
173. Id. at 936, 947.
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liable for their injury.14 The aiding and abetting theory of liability was thus
an issue of first impression for the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, and, not
surprisingly, they declined to release their en banc decision regarding the
Unocal case until after the Supreme Court decided Sosa.'75 Unfortunately,
the Sosa decision provided little guidance on this issue, save to mention that
private actor or entity liability under the ATS is subject to debate. 76 The
Sosa Court furthermore did not address whether a theory of liability
involved in an ATS claim can arise according to federal common law tort
principles, or whether the theory of liability itself must meet the Sosa
standard for determining an actionable violation of the law of nations.
On the one hand, the Unocal plaintiffs could take the Supreme Court's
silence on the matter to mean that principles of tort law, such as aiding and
abetting liability, could and should be used "to effectuate the jurisdiction
granted in the ATS."' 77 As Judge Reinhardt noted in his concurrence in the
2002 Ninth Circuit Unocal decision, 17 8 the Unocal plaintiffs could argue that
the same standard of aiding and abetting liability set forth under U.S. federal
law--"'when the defendant knowingly and substantially assisted tortious
conduct'"-should apply to claims that arise under the ATS. 7 9 From this
perspective, if forced labor is an actionable ATS claim, Unocal's liability is
ascertainable under settled principles of civil liability in U.S. courts.
On the other hand, in light of Sosa's cautious tone,18 it is perhaps more
reasonable to conclude that the Court intended for all causes of action,
including the subsidiary rules of liability, to qualify as actionable norms
under international law.' 8' Should this be the case, aiding and abetting must
qualify as a violation of international law under the Sosa standard as an
independently actionable claim.
174. Pinilla, supra note 40, at 699-700 (noting that the Unocal case was the first case in which a
corporation is being held responsible for human rights abuses committed abroad).
175. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 978-79.
176. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.20 (2004).
177. See Appellants' Response to the United States Amicus Curiae Brief, Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,
395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (Nos. 00-56603, 00-56628, 00-57195, 00-57197), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/responsetodoj-9thcircuitbriefl .pdf [hereinafter Unocal
Appellants' Response].
178. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).
179. See Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 22 (quoting Brief for the United States
as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., Nos. 01-1969, 01-1970
(7th Cir. Nov. 14, 2001), available at http://pdfserver.amlaw.com/nlj/061702dow-amicus.pdf).
180. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2761 (noting that the Court endorses "a restrained conception of the
discretion a federal court should exercise in considering a new cause of action [under the ATS]").
181. See Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 21 (characterizing the government's
position as being that "every legal principle in an ATS case, including subsidiary rules of liability,
must have universal adherence in international law").
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Returning then to the Sosa standard, the first question would be whether
aiding and abetting qualifies as a customary international norm.182 As the
earlier analysis set forth, this means that the norm must be reflected in
consistent state practice, as evidenced by the works of jurists, the general
usage and practice of nations, and judicial decisions that recognize and
enforce that law, and it must also invoke a shared sense of legal obligation
among the international community to adhere to it.'
83
The most significant evidence that aiding and abetting would pass this
test are the recent decisions made by the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda ("ICTR"). 114  Both the ICTY and the ICTR specifically defined
aiding and abetting standards derived from the "exhaustive analysis" of post-
World World II international law, and applied them in the course of their
prosecutions.' 85 In addition, the charters of the ICTY, the ICTR, the
Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, and the International Criminal
Court "embrace the concept of criminal aiding and abetting liability."'
8 6
Furthermore, the United States is party to numerous multilateral treaties that
criminalize the acts of those who aid or abet criminal acts under those
treaties."' Finally, the U.S. government has recognized that aiding and
abetting is defined under international law in forming its policy on
terrorism.' 88 This evidence suggests that even if the Court were to require
182. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion about determining customary international law
through evidence of state practice and opiniojuris.
183. Id.
184. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We find recent decisions by the
[ICTY] and the [ICTR] especially helpful for ascertaining the current standard for aiding and
abetting under international law as it pertains to the [ATS]."), reh 'g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir.
2003), mot. to dismiss granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Unocal Supplemental Brief,
supra note 168, at 18; Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 12-13.
185. Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 15; see also Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950. The
ICTY held that "the actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law requires practical
assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration of the
crime," but noted that "assistance need not have caused the act of the principal." 1d. (quoting
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, IT-95-17/I-T, 1235 (Dec. 10, 1998), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 317 (1999)).
The ICTR defined "the actus reus of aiding and abetting as 'all acts of assistance in the form of
either physical or moral support' that 'substantially contribute to the commission of the crime."'
Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950 (quoting Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-T, 126 (Jan. 27, 2000),
http://www.ictr.org).
186. Unocal Supplemental Brief, supra note 168, at 18.
187. Id. at 18 n.8.
188. Id.; see also Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 12-13. The brief notes that
"United States military commissions prosecute aiding-and-abetting . .. war crimes ... [and]
terrorism... before a military commission," and in so doing, they use a standard derived from the
"law of armed conflict," i.e., international law. Id. (citing Military Commission Instruction No. 2,
Art. 6(C)(1) (Apr. 30, 2003)).
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that aiding and abetting meet the first element of the Sosa standard and
qualify as a customary international norm, it would do so.' 9 After all, the
norm against aiding and abetting has been adhered to in international judicial
decisions;' 90 and its inclusion in the four most prominent chartered
international tribunals to date evidences that it is common practice among
nations to adhere to the norm. 9' In addition, with respect to the "opinion
juris prong," the multilateral treaties and the U.S. policy on terrorism
indicate that nations generally acknowledge an obligation to enforce the
violation of aiding and abetting. 92 Aiding and abetting arguably qualifies as
a customary international norm and satisfies Sosa's first stipulation.
Secondly, however, aiding and abetting must also be defined with
Sosa's stringent degree of specificity in order to be actionable under the
ATS.*93 As such, aiding and abetting must be an identifiably certain norm
and carry ramifications for international peace and security. 94 Aiding and
abetting passes this litmus test superficially, at best. Most problematically,
aiding and abetting is a broad concept that may be defined differently under
the common criminal codes of every nation, and there is no apparent
consensus in the international community regarding the scope of aiding and
abetting liability. 95  Furthermore, it is a stretch to argue that aiding and
abetting poses a threat to state-to-state relations and international peace, in
and of itself. Evaluated on its own, aiding and abetting would seem to meet
the same fate as Alvarez-Machain's arbitrary detention claim: dismissal for
failure to constitute a customary international norm with the Sosa Court's
requisite degree of specificity. 96 In fact, a broad notion such as aiding and
189. See supra Part III.B.1 for a discussion about determining customary international law
through evidence of state practice and opiniojuris.
190. Id.; see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the ICTY
and ICTR judicial decisions), reh "g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss granted,
403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
191. Unocal Supplemental Brief, supra note 168, at 18 (referencing the following four tribunals
during discussion regarding aiding and abetting: Nuremberg International Military Tribunal Control
Council Order No. 10; Statute of the ICTY art. 7(1) (1993, updated 2004); Statute of the ICTR art.
6(1); and Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998)).
192. See id. at 18 n.8; Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 12-13.
193. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion on "Requisite Degree of Specificity."
194. Id.
195. See Unocal Supplemental Brief, supra note 168, at 18-19 (noting that "although there is a
substantial international consensus on the general concept of extending aiding and abetting criminal
liability to offenses punishable by international tribunals, this fact does not translate to an established
principle of extending criminal aiding and abetting liability concepts to the civil context").
196. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2769 (2004) (noting that Alvarez's request
that the Court recognize a private cause of action for arbitrary detention did not have the specificity
the Court requires; that "[c]reating a private cause of action to further that aspiration would go
beyond any residual common law discretion [it thinks] appropriate to exercise;" and that it did not
violate any "norm of customary international law so well defined as to support the creation of a
federal remedy").
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abetting would seem to be the very type of claim the Supreme Court seeks to
invalidate by setting forth its stringent standard.
This demonstrates that Sosa standard's impact on pending ATS claims,
such as Unocal, cannot be underestimated. In a pre-Sosa court room, aiding
and abetting may have qualified as an actionable claim under a basic
customary international law analysis.197 Post-Sosa, however, it is apparent
that a far greater degree of specificity will be required to support the creation
of a federal remedy for a new claim-and this is a threshold that aiding and
abetting would be unlikely to meet. The outcome of ATS cases involving
corporate defendants may consequently hinge on whether the Court chooses
to adopt Judge Reinhardt's view that only the underlying substantive claim
should be scrutinized according to the Sosa standard, or whether aiding and
abetting must qualify as an actionable norm itself. 98 The Sosa Court did not
take a position on this issue.'
99
V. CONCLUSION: A CALL FOR GUIDANCE
In deciding Sosa, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to close the
door completely on the United States' ability to provide a forum for holding
human rights abusers civilly liable, but it did not. Instead, the Court
affirmed the constitutionality of the ATS and set forth an analytical
framework for ascertaining actionable norms under the statute.200 However,
the Court did not provide the comprehensive guidance for adjudicating ATS
claims that lower courts, human rights advocates, and ATS defendants such
as Unocal may have been waiting for.20' For example, the Court raised, but
did not address, issues regarding choice of law, the political question
doctrine, forum non conveniens, judgment enforcement, and of course the
potential liability of non-state actors such as corporate defendants. 02 In the
end, the Supreme Court recognized in Sosa that the U.S. judiciary has a
continued and pivotal role to play in holding violators of the law of nations
197. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
198. See Unocal Appellants' Response, supra note 177, at 22. Instead of holding that aiding and
abetting need constitute a separate violation of the law of nations, a court could elect to apply U.S.
principles of civil liability, federal common law agency, joint venture, and recklessness. Id.
199. See Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2763-64.
200. See id. at 2761-62.
201. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 967 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the choice of law
implications for the Unocal case), reh g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), mot. to dismiss
granted, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005); Pinilla, supra note 40; Beth Van Schaak, International Law
Weekend Proceedings: The Civil Enforcement of Human Rights Norms in Domestic Courts, 6 ILSA
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accountable, concluding "[i]t would take some explaining to say now that
federal courts must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm
intended to protect individuals. 203 Unless Congress takes additional action,
however, the scope of this role under the auspices of the ATS is a narrow
one.
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